Externalism has become a very popular theory of knowledge, and for good reasons. The theory -which says, roughly, that for a true belief to qualify as an instance of knowledge, it needs only to stand in an appropriate relation to the world -has many advantages. It fits weIl into the overall framework of a "naturalistic epistemology", since the relations which it claims to be relevant for knowledge are all open to normal scientific investigation. It provides effective responses to many of the problems which have troubled epistemology, such as the classical "regress of justification" or the more recent Gettier problem. lAnd it squares much better with our practice of ascribing knowledge to people who are not particularly enlightened or philosophically minded than the more demanding "internalist" views.
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ements in one's theory of knowledge, one has very likely lost faith in the whole externalist project. At any rate, the incorporation of such internalist element forces one to abandon the externalist position. As soon as one has stepped out onto the internalist slippery slope, there is no way to prevent a slide to full-blooded internalism. So if one is attracted to externalism and not particularly impressed with the standard internalist objections, one had better find a way of meeting those objections without making any concessions at all. One has to be a staunch externalist.
To be a staunch externalist is not the same as being a stubborn or dogmatic one. I am not saying that externalism should be maintained even in the face of forceful objections. My point is rather that the objections have much less force than is normally reckoned. There is no real pull towards internalism in the theory of knowledge, only an apparent one. Part of my enterprise is to explain what gives rise to this illusion: why do even convinced externalists feel a strong pull towards internalism?
One can also be a staunch externalist without exaggerating the powers of the theory. Externalism is a very attractive theory, but it certainly has its limitations; it is not an epistemological wonder eure. For instance, externalism cannot in itself provide an answer to the most radical forms of skepticism. And it is of lirnited importance -though not wholly irrelevant, as I shall try to show -when it comes to problems of metajustification. Externalism is nothing more, but also nothing less, than a theory of knowledge, i.e. a description of what knowledge consists in -where knowledge means "plain" or "basic" knowledge, knowledge considered as an ordinary, "mundane" phenomenon, as something I suspect even my rather unreflective, uneducated grandma to have plenty of. This theory can in turn function as an element in a larger epistemological enterprise, but there is no need to be overly optirnistic about what it can yield outside its natural domain.
Externalism and internalism
I shall centre my defence of externalism on a theory of the reliabilist kind, and one that is primarily a theory of justification. Such a theory has been put forward by Alvin Goldman, for instance in his book Epistemology and Cognition (1986) . Part ofmy reason for this choice is that such a theory squares better with our ordinary conception of knowledge, which I take to be captured (roughly) by the standard definition: knowledge is justified true belief.
